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Abstract. In van Benthem [2007] the concept of a public announcement
is used to study the effect of the iterated elimination of strictly dominated
strategies. We offer a simple generalisation of this approach to cover
arbitrary strategic games and many optimality notions. We distinguish
between announcements of optimality and announcements of rationality.
1 Introduction
One of the objectives of the theory of strategic games is to predict the
choices players will make. This is usually done by studying iterated
elimination of strategies that one assumes players will not choose.
In this paper we investigate to what extent this elimination process
can be explained using the concept of public announcements.
Public announcements were introduced into epistemic logic in
Plaza [1989]. In van Benthem [2007] they were used to describe the
process of iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies in a
finite game as a series of public announcements that transform an
epistemic model of the players. In this paper we pursue this idea
and obtain a generalization of van Benthem’s results to arbitrary
strategic games and to various different optimality operators that
the players might employ to select their strategies.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we dis-
cuss the notions we shall rely on. Next, in Section 3 we introduce
optimality properties that we discuss in the paper. We also explain
the crucial distinction between ’local’ and ’global’ properties. Glob-
ality means that each subgame obtained by iterated elimination of
strategies is analyzed in the context of the given initial game, while
locality means that the context is the current subgame.
In Section 4, we consider public announcements of ‘optimality’.
We partially motivate van Benthem’s use of what we call ‘standard’
models for games. In Section 5, we consider public announcements
of ‘rationality’ which are based on players knowledge. This analysis
shows the relevance of the concept of global optimality properties.
Unlike either of the two cited papers, we do not examine any of
the interesting logical questions of axiomatisation or definability.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we introduce notions central to this note, and recall
some basic results concerning them.
2.1 Operators
Consider a fixed complete lattice (D, ⊆ ) with the largest element
⊤. In what follows we use ordinals and denote them by α, β, γ. Given
a, possibly transfinite, sequence (Gα)α<γ of elements of D we denote
their meet by
⋂
α<γ Gα.
Definition 1. Let T be an operator on (D, ⊆ ), i.e., T : D→D.
– We call T contracting if for all G, T (G)⊆G.
– We say that an element G is a fixpoint of T if T (G) = G.
– We define by transfinite induction a sequence of elements T α of
D, where α is an ordinal, as follows:
• T 0 := ⊤,
• T α+1 := T (T α),
• for limit ordinals β, T β :=
⋂
α<β T
α.
– We call the least α such that T α+1 = T α the closure ordinal
of T and denote it by αT . We call then T
αT the outcome of
(iterating) T and write it alternatively as T∞. ✷
So an outcome is a fixpoint reached by a transfinite iteration
that starts with the largest element. In general, the outcome of an
operator does not need to exist but we have the following obvious
observation.
Note 1. Every contracting operator T on (D, ⊆ ) has an outcome,
i.e., T∞ is well-defined. ✷
2.2 Strategic games
Given n players (n > 1) by a strategic game (in short, a game) we
mean a sequence (S1, . . ., Sn, p1, . . ., pn), where for all i ∈ {1, . . ., n},
Si is the non-empty set of strategies available to player i, and pi
is the payoff function for the player i, so pi : S1 × . . .× Sn→R,
where R is the set of real numbers.
We denote the strategies of player i by si, possibly with some
superscripts. Given s ∈ S1× . . .×Sn we denote the ith element of s
by si, write sometimes s as (si, s−i), and use the following standard
notation:
– s−i := (s1, . . ., si−1, si+1, . . ., sn),
– S−i := S1 × . . .× Si−1 × Si+1 × . . .× Sn.
In the remainder of the paper we assume an initial strategic game
H := (H1, . . ., Hn, p1, . . ., pn).
A restriction of H is a sequence (G1, . . ., Gn) such that Gi ⊆Hi
for all i ∈ {1, . . ., n}. We identify the restriction (H1, . . ., Hn) with
H . We shall focus on the complete lattice that consists of the set
of all restrictions of the game H ordered by the componentwise set
inclusion:
(G1, . . ., Gn)⊆ (G
′
1, . . ., G
′
n) iff Gi ⊆G
′
i for all i ∈ {1, . . ., n}.
So H is the largest element in this lattice and
⋂
α<γ is the customary
set-theoretic operation on the restrictions.
Consider now a restriction G := (G1, . . ., Gn) ofH and two strate-
gies si, s
′
i from Hi (so not necessarily from Gi). We say that si is
strictly dominated on G by s′i (and write s
′
i ≻G si) if
∀s−i ∈ G−i pi(s
′
i, s−i) > pi(si, s−i),
and that si is weakly dominated on G by s
′
i (and write s
′
i ≻
w
G si)
if
∀s−i ∈ G−ipi(s
′
i, s−i) ≥ pi(si, s−i) ∧ ∃s−i ∈ G−ipi(s
′
i, s−i) > pi(si, s−i).
Given a restriction G′ := (G′1, . . ., G
′
n) of H , we say that the
strategy si from Hi is a best response in G
′ to s−i ∈ G−i if
∀s′i ∈ G
′
i pi(si, s−i) ≥ pi(s
′
i, s−i).
2.3 Possibility correspondences
In this and the next subsection we recall the basic notions, following
Battigalli and Bonanno [1999]. Fix a non-empty set Ω of states . By
an event we mean a subset of Ω.
A possibility correspondence is a mapping from Ω to the
powerset P(Ω) of Ω. The following three properties of a possibility
correspondence P are relevant:
(i) for all ω, P (ω) 6= ∅,
(ii) for all ω and ω′, ω′ ∈ P (ω) implies P (ω′) = P (ω),
(iii) for all ω, ω ∈ P (ω).
If the possibility correspondence satisfies properties (i)–(iii), we
call it a knowledge correspondence.4 Note that each knowledge
correspondence P yields a partition {P (ω) | ω ∈ Ω} of Ω.
4 In the modal logic terminology a knowledge correspondence is a frame for the modal
logic S5, see, e.g. Blackburn, de Rijke and Venema [2001].
2.4 Models for games
We now link possibility correspondences with strategic games. Given
a restriction G := (G1, . . ., Gn) of the initial game H , by amodel for
G we mean a set of states Ω together with a sequence of functions
si : Ω→Gi, where i ∈ {1, . . ., n}. We denote it by (Ω, s1, . . ., sn).
In what follows, given a function f and a subset E of its domain,
we denote by f(E) the range of f on E and by f |E the restriction
of f to E.
By the standard model M for G we mean the model in which
– Ω := G1 × . . . × Gn (which means that for ω ∈ Ω, ωi is well-
defined),
– si(ω) := ωi.
So the states of the standard model for G are exactly the joint strate-
gies in G, and each si is a projection function. Since the initial game
H is given, we know the payoff functions p1, . . ., pn. So in the context
of H a standard model is just an alternative way of representing a
restriction of H .
Given a (not necessarily standard) model M := (Ω, s1, . . ., sn)
for a restriction G and a vector of events E = (E1, . . ., En) in M we
define
GE := (s1(E1), . . ., sn(En))
and call it the restriction of G to E. When each Ei equals E we
write GE instead of GE .
Finally, we extend the notion of a model for a restriction G to
a knowledge model for G by assuming that each player i has a
knowledge correspondence Pi on Ω.
3 Local and global properties
Given player i in the initial strategic gameH := (H1, . . ., Hn, p1, . . ., pn)
we formalize his notion of optimality using a property φi(si, G) that
holds between a strategy si ∈ Gi and a restrictionG ofH . Intuitively,
φi(si, G) holds if si is an ‘optimal’ strategy for player i within the
restriction G, assuming that he uses the property φi to select optimal
strategies.
We distinguish between what we call ‘local’ and ‘global’ optimal-
ity. This terminology is from Apt [2007]. To assess optimality of a
strategy si locally within the restriction G, it is sufficient for i to
compare si with only those strategies s
′
i that occur in Gi. On the
other hand, to assess the optimality of si globally, player i must con-
sider all of his strategies s′i that occur in his strategy set Hi in the
initial game H .
Global properties are then those in which a player’s strategy
is evaluated with respect to all his strategies in the initial game,
whereas local properties are concerned solely with a comparison of
strategies available in the restriction G. We will write φl when we
refer to a local property, and φg when we refer to a global property.
Here are some natural examples. We also give one example in both
its local and global form in order to illustrate the distinction between
them:
– sdli(si, G) that holds iff the strategy si of player i is not strictly
dominated on G by any strategy from Gi (i.e., ¬∃s
′
i ∈ Gi s
′
i ≻G
si),
– sd
g
i (si, G) that holds iff the strategy si of player i is not strictly
dominated on G by any strategy from Hi (i.e., ¬∃s
′
i ∈ Hi s
′
i ≻G
si),
– wdli(si, G) that holds iff the strategy si of player i is not weakly
dominated on G by any strategy from Gi (i.e., ¬∃s
′
i ∈ Gi s
′
i ≻
w
G
si),
– brli(si, G) that holds iff the strategy si of player i is a best response
amongGi to some s−i ∈ G−i, i.e., ∃s−i ∈ G−i∀s
′
i ∈ Gipi(si, s−i) ≥
pi(s
′
i, s−i)).
Each sequence of properties φ := (φ1, . . ., φn) determines an op-
erator Tφ on the restrictions of H defined by
Tφ(G) := (G
′
1, . . ., G
′
n),
where G := (G1, . . ., Gn) and for all i ∈ {1, . . ., n}
G′i := {si ∈ Gi | φi(si, G)}.
Since Tφ is contracting, by Note 1 it has an outcome, i.e., T
∞
φ
is
well-defined. Tφ(G) is the result of removing from G all strategies
that are not φi-optimal. So the outcome of Tφ is the result of the
iterated elimination of strategies that for player i are not φi-optimal,
where i ∈ {1, . . ., n}. In the literature, see, e.g. Lipman [1991], Chen,
Long and Luo [2007] and Apt [2007], examples are given showing that
for the above optimality notions in general transfinite iterations are
necessary to reach the outcome.
When each property φi equals sd
l, we write T
sd
l instead of T
sd
l
and similarly with other specific properties.
In the next section we assume that each player i employs some
property φi to select his strategies, and we analyze the situation
in which this information becomes commonly known via public an-
nouncements. To determine which strategies are then selected by the
players we shall use the Tφ operator.
4 Public announcements of optimality
We show that for a large class of properties φi the outcome T
∞
φ
of the
iterated elimination of strategies that for player i are not φi-optimal
can be characterized by means of the concept of a public announce-
ment. This approach, inspired by van Benthem [2007], applies to all
global properties introduced in Section 3.
The particular kind of “public announcement” that we will be
interested in is a set of true statements, one by each player i to the
effect that i will not play any strategy that is not optimal for him,
according to his notion of optimality. Note that there is no strategic
element to these announcements: the players simply follow a protocol
from which they cannot deviate. The announcements are “public”
in the sense that every other player ’hears’ them as they happen.
The iterated public announcements can be thought of as a pro-
cess in which the players learn how the game will be played. The
limit of this learning process represents the situation in which the
announcements lead to no change in the model, at which point it
can be said that rationality has been learned by all players. It is in
this sense that public announcements provide alternative epistemic
foundations for the outcome T∞
φ
.
Let us clarify first what we would like to achieve. Consider a
modelM for the initial game H . The process of iterated elimination
of the strategies that are not φi-optimal, formalized by the iterated
applications of the Tφ operator, produces a sequence T
α
φ
, where α is
an ordinal, of restrictions of H . We would like to mimic it on the
side of the models, so that we get a corresponding sequence Mα of
models of these restrictions.
To make this idea work we need to define an appropriate way of
reducing models. We take care of it by letting the players repeatedly
announce that they only select φi-optimal strategies. This brings
us to the notions of public announcements and their effects on the
models.
Given a model M = (Ω, s1, . . ., sn) for some restriction of H we
define
– a public announcement by player i in a modelM as an event
E in M,
– given a vector E := (E1, . . ., En) of public announcements by
players 1, . . ., n we let
[E](M) := (∩ni=1Ei, (sj |∩
n
i=1Ei)j∈{1,. . .,n})
and call it the effect of the public announcements of E
on M.
Given a property φi that player i uses to select his strategies
in the restriction G of H and a model M := (Ω, s1, . . ., sn) for G
we define [[φi]] as the event in M that player i selects optimally his
strategies with respect to G. Formally:
[[φi]] := {ω ∈ Ω | φi(si(ω), G)}.
We abbreviate the vector ([[φ1]], . . ., [[φn]]) to [[φ]].
We want now to obtain the reduction of a model M of G to a
model M of Tφ(G) by means of the just defined vector [[φ]] of public
announcements.
The effect of the public announcements of E on a model of G
should ideally be a model of the restriction GE . Unfortunately, this
does not hold in such generality. Indeed, let the two-player game G
have the strategy sets G1 := {U,D}, G2 := {L,R} and consider the
model M for G with Ω := {ωul, ωdr} and the functions s1 and s2
defined by
s1(ωul) = U, s2(ωul) = L, s1(ωdr) = D, s2(ωdr) = R.
Let E = ({ωul}, {ωdr}). Then [E](M) = ∅, which is not a model of
GE = ({U}, {R}). This simple example is depicted in Figure 1.
L R
U ωul
D ωdr
Fig. 1. A motivating example for the use of standard models
A remedy lies in restricting one’s attention to standard models.
However, in order to find a faithful public announcement analogue
to strategy elimination we must also narrow the concept of a public
announcement as follows. A proper public announcement by
player i in a standard model is a subset of Ω = G1× . . .×Gn of the
form G1 × . . .×Gi−1 ×G
′
i ×Gi+1 × . . .×Gn.
So a proper public announcement by a player is an event that
amounts to a ‘declaration’ by the player that he will limit his atten-
tion to a subset of his strategies, that is, will discard the remaining
strategies. So when each player makes a proper public announce-
ment, their combined effect on the standard model is that the set
of states (or equivalently, the set of joint strategies) becomes appro-
priately restricted. An example, which is crucial for us, of a proper
public announcement in a standard model is of course [[φi]].
The following note links in the desired way two notions we intro-
duced. It states that the effect of the proper public announcements
of E on the standard model for G is the standard model for the
restriction of GE.
Note 2. LetM be the standard model forG and E a vector of proper
public announcements by players 1, . . ., n inM. Then [E](M) is the
standard model for GE .
Proof.We only need to check that ∩ni=1Ei is the set of joint strategies
of the restriction GE . But each Ei is a proper announcement, so
it is of the form G1 × . . . × Gi−1 × G
′
i × Gi+1 × . . . × Gn, where
G = (G1, . . ., Gn). So ∩
n
i=1Ei = G
′
1 × . . .×G
′
n.
Moreover, each function si is a projection, so
GE = (s1(E1), . . ., sn(En)) = (G
′
1, . . ., G
′
n).
✷
We also have the following observation that links the vector [[φ]]
of public announcements with the operator Tφ of Section 3.
Note 3. LetM := (Ω, s1, . . ., sn) be the standard model for G. Then
Tφ(G) = G[[φ]].
Proof. Let G = (G1, . . ., Gn), Tφ(G) = (G
′
1, . . ., G
′
n) and G[[φ]] =
(S ′′1 , . . ., S
′′
n).
Fix i ∈ {1, . . ., n}. Then we have the following string of equiva-
lences:
si ∈ G
′
i
iff si ∈ Gi ∧ φi(si, G)
(si is onto) iff si ∈ Gi ∧ ∃ω ∈ Ω (si = si(ω) ∧ φi(si(ω), G))
iff si ∈ Gi ∧ ∃ω ∈ [[φi]] (si = si(ω))
iff si ∈ S
′′
i .
✷
Denote now by [[φ]]
∞
the iterated effect of the public announce-
ments of [[φ]] starting with the standard model for the initial game
H . The following conclusion then relates the iterated elimination of
the strategies that for player i are not φi-optimal to the iterated
effects of the corresponding public announcements.
Theorem 1. [[φ]]
∞
is the standard model for the restriction T∞
φ
.
Proof. By Notes 2 and 3. ✷
Note that in the above theorem each effect of the public an-
nouncements of [[φ]] is considered on a different standard model.
5 Public announcements of rationality
The above analysis gives an account of public announcements of
the optimality of players’ strategies. We now extend this analysis to
public announcements of rationality which takes into account play-
ers’ knowledge. To this end we additionally assume for each player
a knowledge correspondence Pi : Ω → P(Ω).
We define then the event of player i being φi-rational in the
restriction G as
〈φi〉 := {ω ∈ Ω | φi(si(ω), GPi(ω))}.
Note that when player i knows that the state is in Pi(ω), the
restriction GPi(ω) represents his knowledge about the players’ strate-
gies. That is, GPi(ω) is the game he knows to be relevant to his choice.
Hence φi(si(ω), GPi(ω)) captures the idea that if player i uses φi to
select his optimal strategy in the game he considers relevant, then
in the state ω he indeed acts ‘rationally’.
Again we abbreviate (〈φ1〉, . . . , 〈φn〉) to 〈φ〉. Note that 〈φ〉 de-
pends on the underlying knowledge model (Ω, s1, . . ., sn, P1, . . ., Pn)
and on G.
We extend the definition of the effect of the public announce-
ments E := (E1, . . ., En) to knowledge models in the natural way, by
restricting each possibility correspondence to the intersection of the
events in E:
[E](M, P1, . . ., Pn) = ([E]M, P1 |∩
n
i=1Ei, . . ., Pn |∩
n
i=1Ei).
This definition is in the same spirit as in Plaza [1989] and in Osborne
and Rubinstein [1994, page 72], where it is used in the analysis of
the puzzle of the hats.
We aim to find a class of knowledge models for which, under
a mild restriction on the properties φi, 〈φ〉
∞, the iterated effect of
the public announcements of 〈φ〉 starting with the standard knowl-
edge model for the initial game H , will be the standard knowledge
model for T∞
φ
. We will therefore use a natural choice of possibility
correspondences, which we call the standard possibility corre-
spondences :
Pi(ω) = {ω
′ ∈ Ω | si(ω) = si(ω
′)}.
In particular, for the standard model
Pi(ω) := {ω
′ | ωi = ω
′
i}
By the standard knowledge model for a restriction G we now
mean the standard model for G endowed with the standard possi-
bility correspondences.
The following observation holds.
Note 4. Consider the standard knowledge model (Ω, s1, . . ., sn, P1, . . ., Pn)
for a restriction G := (G1, . . ., Gn) of H and a state ω ∈ Ω. Then for
all ω ∈ Ω
GPi(ω) = (G1, . . ., Gi−1, {ωi}, Gi+1, . . ., Gn).
Proof. Immediate by the fact that in the standard knowledge model
for each possibility correspondence we have Pi(ω) = {ω
′ ∈ Ω | ω′i =
ωi}. ✷
Intuitively, this observation states that in each state of a standard
knowledge model each player knows his own choice of strategy but
knows nothing about the strategies of the other players. So standard
possibility correspondences represent the knowledge of each player
after he has privately selected his strategy but no information be-
tween the players has been exchanged. It is in that sense that the
standard knowledge models are natural. In van Benthem [2007] in
effect only such models are considered.
A large class of properties φi satisfy the following restriction:
A For all (G1, . . . , Gn) and G
′
i
φi(si, (Gi, G−i)) ↔ φi(si, (G
′
i, G−i)).
That restriction on the properties φi is sufficient to obtain the fol-
lowing analogue of Theorem 1 for the case of public announcements
of rationality.
Theorem 2. Suppose that each property φ1, . . ., φn satisfiesA. Then
〈φ〉∞ is the standard knowledge model for the restriction T∞
φ
.
Proof. Notice that it suffices to prove for each restriction G the
following statement for each i:
∀ω ∈ Ω (φi(ωi, G) ↔ φi(ωi, GPi(ω))). (1)
Indeed, (1) entails that 〈φi〉 = [[φi]], in which case the result
follows from Theorem 1 and the observation that the possibility cor-
respondences are restricted in the appropriate way.
But (1) is a direct consequence of the assumption of A and of
Note 4. ✷
To see the consequences of the above result note that A holds
for each global property sd gi , wd
g
i , and br
g
i introduced in Section 3.
For each φi equal sd
g
i and finite games Theorem 2 boils down to
Theorem 7 in van Benthem [2007]. The corresponding result for each
φi equal to br
g
i and finite games is mentioned at the end of Section
5.4 of that paper.
It is important to note that the above Theorem does not hold
for the corresponding local properties sd li , wd
l
i , or br
l
i introduced
in Section 3. Indeed, for each such property φi we have φi(ωi, G) for
each state ωi and restriction G in which player i has just one strategy.
So by Note 4 φi(ωi, GPi(ω)) holds for each state ω and restriction G.
Consequently 〈φ〉 = Ω. So when each φi is a local property listed
above, 〈φ〉 is an identity operator on the standard knowledge models,
that is 〈φ〉∞ is the standard knowledge model for the initial game H
and not T∞
φ
.
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